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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
v. 
MATTHEW L. DESPAIN, 
Respondent/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20010761-CA 
APPELLEE'S REHEARING PETITION 
REHEARING ISSUE 
Should this Court have decided whether the trial court erred in considering Officer 
Slaugh's knowledge of defendant in determining whether Officer Olson had reasonable 
suspicion to ask defendant about weapons where (1) neither party briefed the issue; (2) the 
issue is one of first impression in Utah; (3) substantial case law allows attribution of 
knowledge amongst officers working closely in concert; and (4) determination of the issue 
was not necessary to the Court's final decision in this case? 
CASE STATEMENT 
Defendant was charged by information with operating a clandestine laboratory and 
possession or use of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, both second degree 
felonies; transportation or possession of items prohibited in a correctional or mental health 
facility, a third degree felony; reckless endangerment, a class A misdemeanor; and 
possession of drug paraphernalia and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, both class B 
misdemeanors (R. 3-5). A forfeiture demand was also entered. (Id.) Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search of his vehicle and attached trailer 
(R. 38-45). Following a hearing, the trial court entered a written ruling denying defendant's 
motion (R. 46-52). 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to operation of a clandestine laboratory, 
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress (R. 64-71, 74-
75). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen years (R. 77-
81). That sentence was suspended, however, and defendant was ordered to serve nine 
months in jail and 36 months probation (Id.). The court also ordered defendant's forfeiture 
of $1,416.00 cash found in the search (R. 72-73). 
Defendant timely appealed his conviction (R. 84-85). This Court affirmed his 
conviction in a published opinion filed July 25, 2003. See State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 
266 (attached at Addendum A). 
ARGUMENT 
The State seeks rehearing to address one sentence and its related footnote in the 
Court's opinion that concluswily decides an issue of first impression in Utah that was not 
briefed by the parties and that is not necessary to the Court's final decision: 
Despain argues that the trial court erred in relying upon the prior 
encounter between Slaugh and Despain to support its decision that 
Olsen's question was supported by reasonable suspicion. We agree.3 
However, "[i]t is well settled that we may affirm a judgment of a lower 
2 
court if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, U 31,994 P.2d 1243.4 
State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 266, f 10. Footnote 3 then states: 
The trial court relied on the prior contact between Slaugh and 
Despain to support its decision to deny Despain's motion to suppress. 
However, Slaugh merely asked Despain for his license and registration, 
while it was Olsen who asked Despain about weapons. Moreover, 
Olsen did not know of the prior encounter between Slaugh and Despain 
and the testimony of Slaugh makes clear that Olsen had no reason to 
believe anything more than a simple traffic stop was occurring prior to 
their approaching the truck to complete the traffic stop. Accordingly, 
because Olsen had no history with Despain and was not aware of 
Slaugh's history with Despain, the trial court erred in considering the 
prior encounter as material to the issue. 
Id. at f 10 n.3. Footnote 3 includes no citation to legal authority. 
For the reasons stated below, the State respectfully asks this Court to remove footnote 
3 from its opinion and to amend paragraph 10 as follows: 
Despain argues that the trial court erred in relying upon the prior 
encounter between Slaugh and Despain to support its decision that 
Olsen's question was supported by reasonable suspicion. We do not 
reach this issue, however, because "[i]t is well settled that we may 
affirm a judgment of a lower court if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 
10,1f 31, 994 P.2d 1243/ 
(alterations bolded and italicized). The State thus asks this Court to amend its opinion to 
remove the challenged sentence and footnote and, as it did with another issue in this case, 
"reserve [its] analysis of the [issue] for an appropriate case." Despain, 2003 UT 266, ^  9 n.2. 
The State does not seek to alter the result, and the corrections the State seeks will not 
do so. 
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I. Relevant proceedings. 
At defendant's preliminary hearing, Officer Olson testified that he did not remember 
Officer Slaugh telling him anything about defendant prior to stopping defendant's vehicle 
(R. 87:82). Officer Olson, however, never ruled out that possibility. Rather, he testified, 
"It's very possible. He could have" (R. 87:82). "I don't specifically recall the exact words, 
but its possible" (R. 87:83). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered in connection 
with his arrest (R. 38-45). Defendant's memorandum in support of his motion did not 
include any argument that Officer Olson lacked reasonable suspicion to question him about 
weapons because Officer Olson lacked the knowledge Officer Slaugh had concerning him 
(see id.). In fact, throughout the memorandum, defendant referred to the officers 
interchangeably, as if they were one (see id.). 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Slaugh testified that, as soon as he heard that the 
truck they were following was registered to defendant, he became concerned that defendant 
might be armed because of a prior incident in which defendant had been found in possession 
of a concealed weapon (R. 106:40). However, Officer Slaugh did not have a conversation 
with Officer Olson before exiting their vehicle concerning defendant or Officer Slaugh's 
prior encounter with him (R. 106:41-42). Officer Olson did not testify at the suppression 
hearing. 
In its suppression ruling, the trial court concluded: 
4 
As one officer is asking for a license, another officer was asking 
whether Mr. Despain had any weapons. In light of the officer's 
previously dealings with the defendant, approximately thirty days 
before, he knew that he had been recently armed with a handgun and 
considered armed and dangerous. 
Therefore, in light of the very recent history, the inquiry, for 
officer safety was authorized. 
(R. 48). 
In his docketing statement, defendant indicated that he wished to challenge "[w]hether 
the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop [his] vehicle[;] and [w]hether the scope of the 
subsequent detention exceeded justification for the stop." See Docketing Statement at 2.1 
Nowhere did defendant indicate that he wished to address whether Officer Olson was aware 
of Officer Slaugh's prior knowledge of defendant. See id. 
In his brief on appeal, defendant treated Officers Slaugh and Olson as if both were 
familiar with defendant from a prior arrest. See Aplt. Br. at 4 ("Olsen asked the question 
about weapons because about one month earlier he had stopped the appellant [and] [a]t that 
time the appellant was carrying a firearm."). None of his arguments challenged whether the 
trial court properly considered defendant's prior contact with Officer Slaugh in concluding 
that Officer Olson had reasonable suspicion to ask defendant about weapons. See Aplt. Br. 
at 6-19. Rather, defendant only challenged generally whether the circumstances of the stop, 
in conjunction with the officers' prior knowledge, provided reasonable suspicion to question 
defendant about weapons. See id. 
defendant raises two other issues in his docketing statement; however, neither 
concerns the initial stop and questioning of defendant. 
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As a consequence, the State did not address any differences between Officer Slaugh's 
knowledge and Officer Olson's knowledge—or the legal significance of any differences—in 
its responsive brief See Aple. Br. at 7-22. 
For the first time during oral argument, defense counsel distinguished between what 
Officer Slaugh knew and what Officer Olson knew at the time defendant was questioned. 
See 17 April 2003 Oral Argument. Defense counsel first noted that, at the suppression 
hearing, Officer Slaugh testified that he did not tell Officer Olson about his prior encounter 
with defendant before they stopped defendant for the taillight violation. See id. He then 
noted that Officer Olson did not testify at the suppression hearing. See id. Counsel 
concluded: "So what you've got is a situation that, an officer who we don't know if he knew 
about the prior encounter, is asking about the weapons." Id. 
When Judge Thome questioned counsel concerning whether the trial court could 
consider Officer Slaugh's prior knowledge about defendant in rendering its decision, defense 
counsel again stated, "Part of the problem with that though is, judge, that the officer who 
asked the question is not the officer who was involved there." Id. Judge Thome then noted, 
"From Judge Davis's ruling, it's not clear that that's what he found." Id. Counsel responded: 
"[P]art of the problem with that is that . . . we don't know if Olson had that knowledge and 
in terms of the reasonable suspicion analysis, I think we need to have some showing that 
when asking the question . . . that particular officer had that as a basis of his suspicion." Id. 
Judge Thome continued, "But if you're challenging that finding, don't you have to marshal 
the evidence that would have supported Judge Davis's conclusion?" Id. Counsel concluded 
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that the evidence concerning Officer Slaugh's prior encounter was in the record; the only 
question was whether Officer Olson knew about it. See id. 
In response, the State argued that, even absent a determination of whether Officer 
Olson knew about Officer Slaugh's prior interaction with defendant, there was an abundance 
of reasonable suspicion to ask defendant about weapons. See id. 
In its opinion, this Court agreed with the State that, even absent evidence that Officer 
Olson knew about Officer Slaugh's prior knowledge of defendant, the evidence was 
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to ask defendant about whether he had weapons. 
See Despain, 2003 UT App 266, f 11. This Court nonetheless decided that, absent proof that 
Officer Olson knew about Officer Slaugh's prior knowledge of defendant, "the trial court 
erred in considering the prior encounter as material to the issue." See id., 2003 UT App 266, 
Tf 10, n.3. This Court did so even while deciding not to reach another issue—which was 
actually briefed by the parties—because "our conclusion that Despain's behavior following 
the stop reasonably led the officers to believe that he was armed and dangerous forecloses 
any need to [address that issue]." Id., 2003 UT App 266, J 9 n.2. 
II. This Court should amend its opinion to remove an unsupported ruling on 
an issue of first impression that was not briefed by the parties. 
"'It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been 
designated as issues on appeal in a docketing statement or in the briefs.'" State v. Arviso, 
1999 UT App 381, f 4 n.2,993 P.2d 894 (quoting State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987,994 (Utah 
1989)). 
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The reasons for this rule are two-fold. "First, this rule protects the opposing party, 
which receives no notice as to any issues not found in the docketing statement or briefs and 
therefore has no chance to prepare to refute the unbriefed issues at oral argument with a 
reasoned analysis supported by legal authority." Id. "Second," as in this case, "when 
[defendant] raised this new issue at oral argument, he offered no supporting legal authority." 
Id. 
Thus, this Court generally does not reach issues raised only during oral argument. See 
id. ("'It is . . . well settled that this court need not address issues that a party has not 
briefed.'") (quotingMaack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570,575 n.3 (Utah 
App 1994)); see also Gilleyv. Blackstock, 2002 UT App 414, \ 10n.2,61 P.3d 305 (refusing 
to reach issue raised "[i]n earlier proceedings and at oral argument" where party "did not 
argue this issue in her brief). 
In this case, defendant did not challenge the trial court's assumption that Officer 
Olson was aware of Officer Slaugh's prior encounter with defendant at trial, in his docketing 
statement, or in his brief on appeal. Thus, the State had no opportunity to brief that issue on 
the merits. Moreover, when he raised the issue at oral argument, defendant provided no legal 
support for his claim that the trial court erred in relying on that assumption in finding 
reasonable suspicion to question defendant about his weapons. 
Under such circumstances, this Court should not have reached the merits of this issue 
in its opinion. See Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, If 4 n.2. This is especially so where, as here, 
a holding on this issue was not necessary to this Court's final decision. See Despain, 2003 
8 
UT App 266, T[ 10 ("However, *[i]t is well settled that we may affirm a judgment of a lower 
court if if is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.'") (citation 
omitted). The State therefore respectfully asks this Court to amend its opinion to omit the 
merits discussion of this issue. 
HI. This Court should amend its opinion to remove an unsupported ruling on 
an unbriefed issue of first impression where other jurisdictions have 
applied the "collective knowledge rule" under similar fact scenarios 
In State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986), the supreme court held that, 
"[i]n making a probable cause determination, a police officer is entitled to rely on 
information gained from other officers." The court then cited approvingly a case holding that 
'"when officers are involved together in an operation and there is communication between 
them, the collective knowledge of the officers is considered in determining whether there was 
probable cause for the search.'" Id. at 1089 (quoting United States v. Esle, 743 F.2d 1465, 
1476 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
However, the State has found no Utah appellate court decision addressing the extent 
to which Dorsey's "collective knowledge" rule applies in the absence of evidence of 
communication between the officers. 
The general rule appears to be that, when the officers at issue have not actually 
worked together on a case, communication is absolutely required. See, e.g., Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.5(c), pp. 265-67 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Search & Seizure] 
(suggesting that rule requiring communication "is sound, and should unquestionably be 
applied... where the officer who did possess the probable cause was not in close time-space 
9 
proximity to the questioned arrest or search."); State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Neb. 
1992) (noting "collective knowledge of the law enforcement agency for which an officer acts 
may provide the basis for a search and seizure, but some communication of that knowledge 
to the officer conducting the search and seizure is required") (citation omitted). 
However, "when this other officer is at hand, it is to be doubted whether [the 
requirement of actual communication] is inevitably compelled." Search & Seizure, § 3.5(c) 
at pp. 267-69 & n.75. In fact, a number of jurisdictions, including the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, have held or at least intimated that proof of actual communication is not required 
when the officer having the information works in close proximity to the officer conducting 
the search. See, e.g., United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491,1504 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Even 
in the absence of evidence of communication among officers, however, when officers act 
collectively it may sometimes be appropriate to look to their collective knowledge in 
determining whether they behaved reasonably."); see also United States v. Ledford, 218 F.3d 
684, 689 (7th Cir. 2000); State v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24, 30 (5th Cir. 1972); Smith v. State, 
719 So. 2d 1018,1022-25 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1990); Commonwealth v. Wooden, 433 N.E.2d 
1234, 1237 (Mass. App. 1982); State v. Bolton, 801 P.2d 98, 113 (N.M. App. 1990). 
One reason for this exception to the general rule is that "communication among 
officers during the exigencies of a stop or arrest may often be subtle or nonverbal." Shareef, 
100 F.3d at 1504. Thus, this exception recognizes that officers who work closely together 
may "convey suspicions through nonverbal as well as verbal cues." Shareef, 100 F.3d at 
1504 n.6. 
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Another reason for the exception is that a search or seizure, inevitable because of one 
officer's knowledge, should not be invalidated merely because a member of his team without 
such knowledge acted before he did. See Ledford, 218 F.3d at 689 (holding that where 
officers act in joint venture, court may properly consider knowledge of all officers: "Were 
it otherwise, the validity of such jointly conducted searches might turn on the fortuity of 
which officer happened to open a trunk or door, notwithstanding the fact that he and his 
colleagues were acting in concert."); Ragsdale, 470 F.2d at 30 ("The fact that one member 
of the team moved too swiftly" should not invalidate search where, had that member not 
begun the search when he did, the other "would surely have commanded it."); Smith, 719 So. 
2d at 1022-25 (holding that, where officer with knowledge is in close temporal and physical 
proximity of search/arrest, fact that another officer beat him to punch does not defeat 
reasonable suspicion because, if second officer had not conducted search, almost surely first 
officer would have); Wooden, 433 N.E.2d at 1237 (holding that, although neither officer 
alone had sufficient knowledge to support action, where officers "were working in concert, 
and they were within an arm's reach of each other as well as the suspects whom they were 
confronting," combining their knowledge to determine reasonableness of action was 
appropriate); Bolton, 801 P.2d at 113 ("Although [first officer], the one who instructed 
defendants to remain, did not possess the information [the second officer] had acquired, [the 
second officer's] knowledge can validate the detention because of the certainty that.. . [he] 
would not have permitted the truck to depart."). Cf. State v. Ochoa, 639 P.2d 365,368 (Ariz. 
App. 1981) ("It would seem hypertechnical to hold that appellant's arrest was unreasonable 
11 
simply because the race to his location was won by the only officer of all involved who did 
not know about the [additional information]."). 
In this case, both reasons support the trial court's consideration of Officer Slaugh's 
knowledge here. First, although Officer Slaugh testified that he did not speak with Officer 
Olson concerning his prior encounter with defendant, neither Slaugh nor Olson were 
asked—nor was the trial court ever asked to determine—whether Slaugh had communicated 
his concerns to Olson in some other manner, i.e., by general comments reflecting Slaugh's 
concerns, or by nonverbal cues. Under such circumstances, "[a] presumption of 
communication" between officers working together so closely is appropriate. Shareef, 100 
F.3datl504n.6. 
Second, given Officer Slaugh's knowledge, inquiry by him about whether defendant 
possessed weapons in this case was inevitable. The fact that Officer Olson "moved too 
quickly and did what the more knowledgeable [Slaugh] would imminently and lawfully have 
done," does not render the search unreasonable. Ochoa, 639 P.2d at 368; see also Ledford, 
218 F.3d at 689; Ragsdale, 470 F.2d at 30; Smith, 719 So. 2d at 1022-25; Wooden, 433 
N.E.2d at 1237; Bolton, 801 P.2d at 113. 
Given the lack of authoritative Utah case law on this issue, and given the extensive 
case law supporting the trial court's consideration of Officer Slaugh's knowledge in this case, 
this Court should not have decided this issue in a conclusory fashion without citing any legal 
authority and without briefing by the parties. This is especially so where, as previously 
stated, a holding on this issue was not necessary to this Court's final decision. See Despain, 
12 
2003 UT App 266, U 10. The State therefore respectfully asks this Court to amend its 
opinion to omit the merits discussion of this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued, the Court should grant rehearing to correct the errors 
identified above. 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35(a), State's counsel certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED August i£_, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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PETITION FOR REHEARING was mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to the 
following on August iy , 2003: 
G. Fred Metos 
10 West Braodway, Suite 650 
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Attorney for Appellant 
fcu&u G. A c ^ 
14 
Addendum A 
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2003 WL 21707634 
— P.3d — 
(Cite as: 2003 WL 21707634 (Utah App.)) 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, 
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Matthew L. DESPAIN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20010761-CA. 
July 25,2003.. 
Defendant was convicted on a conditional guilty plea 
in the trial court, Fourth District, Heber Department, 
Lynn W. Davis, J., of operating a clandestine drug 
laboratory. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Thorne, J., held that circumstances that officers 
encountered during traffic stop supported reasonable 
belief that defendant was armed and dangerous, and 
thus, officer's questioning of defendant concerning 
weapons possession was justified. 
Affirmed. 
Davis, J., filed opinion concurring and dissenting in 
part. 
HI Automobiles €=>349(18) 
48Ak349(18>> Most Cited Cases 
Circumstances that officers encountered during traffic 
stop supported reasonable belief that defendant was 
armed and dangerous, and thus, officer's questioning of 
defendant concerning weapons possession was 
justified; it was after nightfall when officers approached 
defendant's vehicle, defendant ignored instruction to 
meet officers at patrol car, and instead reentered cab of 
his truck and closed door, and when defendant 
complied with officer's repeated request to meet 
officers at patrol car he approached them wearing shirt 
that obscured from officers' view any object that he 
may have secreted in or around his waistband. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4: U.C.A.1953. 58-37d-4. 
121 Criminal Law €^>1139 
Copr. © West 2003 No ( 
llOkl 139 Most Cited Cases 
121 Criminal Law €>=>1158(4) 
110k! 158(4) Most Cited Cases 
An appellate court reviews factual findings underlying 
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard; 
however, it reviews the trial court's conclusions of law 
based on these findings for correctness, with a measure 
of discretion given to the trial judge's application of 
legal standard to facts. 
[31 Searches and Seizures C=>23 
349k23 Most Cited Cases 
To determine whether a search or a seizure is 
constitutionally reasonable, an appellate court must first 
determine whether officer's action was justified at its 
inception; if so, it then considers whether resulting 
detention was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
141 Automobiles €=>349(3) 
48Ak349(3) Most Cited Cases 
A traffic stop is justified at its inception when the stop 
is incident to a traffic violation committed in an 
officer's presence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
151 Automobiles €=>349(18) 
48Ak349fl8) Most Cited Cases 
During a traffic stop an officer may request a driver's 
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
check, and issue a citation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
161 Automobiles €=^349(18) 
48Ak349(18) Most Cited Cases 
Any further temporary detention for investigative 
questioning after fulfilling the purpose for initial traffic 
stop constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has 
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further 
illegality. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
171 Arrest C=?63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8>) Most Cited Cases 
Where police officer validly stops individual for 
investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes 
that individual may be armed and dangerous, officer 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Page 2 
may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of 
individual, or question individual regarding presence of 
weapons, to discover weapons that might be used 
against him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
M Arrest €=>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
If a Terry frisk, which may be limited to officer simply 
asking about presence of weapons, is challenged by 
defendant following his arrest, state must support 
officer's action by presenting articulable facts that 
would reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude 
that suspect may be armed; basis for this policy is the 
recognition that facts and circumstances unique to the 
particular suspect and/or factual context may give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
1?1 Arrest C==>63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) Most Cited Cases 
If a Terry frisk, or questioning of a citizen about the 
presence of a weapon, is challenged by defendant 
following his arrest, state must present articulable facts 
that would reasonably lead an objective officer to 
conclude that suspect may be armed. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
G. Fred Metos, McCaughey & Metos, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Jeffrey T. 
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OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
*1 % 1 Defendant Matthew Despain appeals from his 
conditional guilty plea to operating a clandestine drug 
laboratory, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-37d-4 (Supp.200n. We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
U 2 On November 6,1999, Despain, his wife, and their 
young son were traveling southbound on SR 40, near 
Heber, Utah. At about midnight, near the intersection of 
SR 40 and SR 189, Heber City Police Officer Troy 
Slaugh noticed that the license plate attached to 
Despain's fifth wheel trailer was not properly lit. 
Accordingly, Slaugh called dispatch with the license 
plate number and learned that the vehicle belonged to 
Despain. Slaugh immediately recognized that he had 
had contact with Despain recently and that the previous 
contact had resulted in Despain being charged with 
both a narcotics violation and a concealed weapon 
violation. 
U 3 Armed with this information, Slaugh initiated a 
traffic stop of Despain. Despain pulled over and Slaugh 
parked behind the fifth-wheel trailer. Both Slaugh and 
his partner, Officer Rusty Olsen, then got out of the 
patrol car and cautiously approached Despain's vehicle. 
As the officers neared the bed of Despain's truck, 
Despain's rottweiler stood up, lunged toward Slaugh 
and began barking furiously, causing both officers to 
draw their sidearms and retreat back to the patrol car. 
Slaugh then yelled for Despain, who at that point had 
exited his truck, to meet the officers near the patrol car, 
away from the truck and the dog. Despain, instead, got 
back into the cab of the truck and closed the door, 
obscuring his subsequent actions from the officers' 
view. Slaugh again yelled to Despain, ordering him to 
meet the officers by the patrol car. Despain then exited 
the truck and walked back to the officers. 
f 4 While he walked, both officers noticed that 
Despain was dressed in blue jeans and a very loose, 
baggy shirt that hung down over his hips. When he 
reached the officers, Slaugh asked for Despain's driver 
license and registration while Olsen asked Despain if he 
was carrying any weapons on his person. Despain 
admitted that he had two knives and began reaching 
toward his waist. Olsen intervened, grabbing and 
searching Despain, whereupon he discovered and 
confiscated two knives. The first knife, a smaller knife 
with a folding blade, was attached vertically to 
Despain's belt and was in a secured covered sheath. The 
second knife, however, was a large heavy knife with a 
fixed blade, loosely placed in a sheath attached 
horizontally across Despain's belly unsecured by either 
a cover or a strap. After a short consultation, Slaugh 
placed Despain under arrest for possession of a 
concealed dangerous weapon. The officers then 
conducted a search of the vehicle incident to the arrest 
and discovered evidence that Despain intended to 
produce, or was in the process of producing, 
methamphetamine. [FN 11 
H 5 Following his arrest, the State charged Despain 
with possession or operating a clandestine drug 
laboratory, possession or use of a controlled substance 
by a person with a prior conviction, transportation or 
possession of items prohibited in a correctional and 
mental health facility, reckless endangerment, 
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possession of drug paraphernalia, and carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon. Despain filed a motion to 
suppress all evidence discovered as a result of Olsen's 
question, arguing that the question was not supported 
by reasonable suspicion. Thus, Despain argues his 
arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle incident 
to the arrest were unconstitutional. On November 15, 
2000, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing. 
The court then denied Despain's motion, following 
which Despain entered into a plea agreement with the 
State, pleading guilty to the clandestine drug lab 
charge. In accepting the plea agreement, pursuant to 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct.App.1988), 
Despain preserved the suppression issue for appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
*2 [11121 1^6 Despain argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered 
as a result of Olsen's question concerning weapons 
possession. " 'We review the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous 
standard.' " State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, «1 9. 999 P.2d 7 
(quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n. 4 (Utah 
1994)). "However, we review the trial court's 
conclusions of law based on these findings 'for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the 
trial judge's application of the legal standard to the 
facts.' " I£ (quoting State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245, 
1247 (Utah Ct.App.1996)). 
r31f4H"5H"61 H 7 "To determine whether a search or a 
seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we must first 
determine whether the officer's action was' "justified at 
its inception." ' " State w Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 450 
(Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 
1132 (Utah 1994) (additional citation omitted)). "If so, 
we then consider whether the resulting detention was' 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first place." ' " Id. 
(citations omitted). "[A] traffic stop is justified at its 
inception when 'the stop is "incident to a traffic 
violation committed in [an officer's] presence."'" State 
v.Hansen, 2002 UT 125,130,63 P3d 650 (alterations 
in original) (citations omitted). Moreover, "during a 
traffic stop an officer 'may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and 
issue a citation.'" hi at 1f 31 (quoting Lopez. 873 P.2d 
at 1132) (additional citations omitted)."' "Any further 
temporary detention for investigative questioning after 
[fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop" ' 
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has 
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further 
illegality." fd_ (quoting State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 
652, 655 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (alteration in original) 
(additional citations omitted)). 
[71[8H8 However," '[w]here a police officer validly 
stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes 
and reasonably believes that the individual may be 
armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" 
or "pat-down" search of the individual, [or question the 
individual regarding the presence of weapons,] to 
discover weapons that might be used against him.' " 
State v. Warren. 2001 UT APP 346, <1 13, 37 P.3d 270 
(quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 
1985)), cert granted, 2002 Utah LEXIS 152. However, 
if the Terry frisk, which may be limited to the officer 
simply asking about the presence of weapons, is 
challenged by the defendant following his arrest, "the 
State must [support the officer's action by] presenting] 
articulable facts that would reasonably lead an objective 
officer to conclude that the suspect may be armed." Id. 
at114 (quoting Carter. 707 P.2d at 659). 
*3 U 9 In the instant case, there is no question, and 
Despain does not argue otherwise, that the traffic stop 
was justified at its inception. The license plate on 
Despain's fifth-wheel trailer was not properly 
illuminated, thus, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-6-120(b) (1998), Slaugh and Olsen were 
justified in stopping Despain to cite him for the 
violation. However, it is also clear that Olsen's 
questioning of Despain concerning weapons possession 
lies outside the scope of the reason for the initial stop. 
Therefore, we must determine whether the 
circumstances that the officers encountered during the 
stop supported either "a reasonable suspicion of a 
further illegality" sufficient to justify the question, 
Hansen. 2002 UT 125 at % 31, 63 P.3d 650. or the 
reasonable belief that Despain was armed and 
dangerous. See Warren. 2001 UT APP 346 at T 13, 37 
P.3d270. TFN21 
K 10 Despain argues that the trial court erred in relying 
upon the prior encounter between Slaugh and Despain 
to support its decision that Olsen's question was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. We agree. I FN31 
However, "[i]t is well settled that we may affirm a 
judgment of a lower court if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record." State v. 
Finlavson. 2000 UT 10,11 31, 994 P.2d 1243. [FN41 
£91 ^ 111 In the instant case, the record supports Olsen's 
actions because the circumstances surrounding the 
traffic stop support a reasonable belief that Despain was 
armed and dangerous." 'Where a police officer validly 
stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes 
and reasonably believes that the individual may be 
armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" 
or "patdown" search of the individual, [or question the 
individual regarding the presence of weapons,] to 
discover weapons that might be used against him.' " 
Warren. 2001 UT App 346 at T 13, 37 P.3d 270 
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(quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 659. However, if the Tcm> 
frisk, or the questioning of a citizen about the presence 
of a weapon, is challenged by the defendant following 
his arrest, "the State must present articulable facts that 
would reasonably lead an objective officer to conclude 
that the suspect may be armed." Id. at 1 14 (quoting 
Carter, 707 P.2d at 659). The basis for this policy is the 
recognition that "facts and circumstances unique to the 
particular suspect and/or factual context may give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be armed." 
Warren. 2001 UT APP 346 at T 15, 37 P.3d 270. 
f 12 Here, it was well after nightfall when the officers 
approached Despain's vehicle. Before they reached the 
cab of the truck, they were accosted by an apparently 
dangerous dog, prompting both officers to draw their 
sidearms and retreat to their patrol car where Slaugh 
noticed for the first time that Despain had dismounted 
his vehicle. Slaugh then instructed Despain to meet the 
officers at the patrol car, an instruction which Despain 
completely ignored. He instead reentered the cab of his 
truck and closed the door concealing any actions he 
may have taken within the truck. When Despain finally 
complied with Slaugh's repeated request to meet the 
officers at the patrol car he approached them wearing 
an untucked, overly-large shirt that obscured from the 
officers' view any object that Despain may have 
secreted in or around his waistband. 
*4 f 13 Based on the factual circumstance of this case, 
we conclude that an objective police officer in Olsen's 
position would have drawn a similar conclusion-that 
Despain may in fact be armed and dangerous~and that 
an objective officer, concerned for his safety and the 
safety of others, would have asked Despain the same 
question. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at 11 14, 37 
P.3d 270 (quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 659). Thus, we 
conclude that Olsen's question to Despain was 
supported by a reasonable suspicion that Despain was 
armed and dangerous. 
CONCLUSION 
H 14 Based on Despain's conduct during the traffic 
stop, it was reasonable for Olsen to believe that 
Despain was possibly armed and dangerous. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of 
Despain's motion to suppress. 
H 151 CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge. 
DAVIS, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
K 16 I concur with the majority's analysis through 
footnote 3, together with its recital of the law applicable 
to "frisk" or "patdown" searches or questions about the 
presence of weapons. 
K 17 Since we are bound by the record and caselaw 
respecting Officer Olsen's apparently limited 
knowledge, and must approach this case accordingly, I 
cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that Officer 
Olsen had reasonable, articulable suspicion to inquire 
whether Despain possessed any weapons. " 
'Investigative questioning that further detains the driver 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more 
serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means 
suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn 
from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer 
at the time of the stop.' " Stare v. Lafond. 2003 UT App 
101. % 13, 68 P.3d 1043 (citations omitted), cert, 
denied, 72 P.3d 685,2003 Utah LEXIS 59 (Utah 2003). 
"The legality of a frisk for weapons[ or a question 
regarding weapons], absent probable cause, is governed 
by Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 
889 0968), and fUtah Code Ann. S 77-7-16 (1999)1." 
Lafond 2003 UT App 101 at 11 18, 68 P.3d 1043 
(footnote omitted). 
K 18 Two basic scenarios warrant a Terry frisk for 
weapons: (1) the "facts and circumstances unique to the 
particular suspect and/or factual context"; and (2) "the 
inherent nature of the crime being investigated." Id. at 
*f 19 (quotations and citations omitted). Under the first 
scenario, the "facts and circumstances" that "may give 
rise to reasonable suspicion [that a] suspect may be 
armed" include bulges in clothing or other items 
appearing to be weapons; or a suspect who denies 
possessing a weapon, yet aggressively approaches an 
officer. Id_ (quotations and citations omitted). Factors 
that do not amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion 
include a suspect's wearing of layered, baggy clothing; 
or mere nervousness not accompanied with aggressive 
or threatening behavior. See id. at T«l 20-21. 
U 19 Under the second scenario, the types of crimes 
whose nature "suggests] the presence of weapons 
include: robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, 
homicide, and dealing in large quantities of narcotics." 
Id. at T 19 (quotations and citations omitted). Lesser 
traffic offenses do not fit within this category. For 
lesser traffic offenses we have required "particular facts 
[to] lead [an] officer to believe that a suspect is armed." 
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
*5 H 20 Neither scenario existed in this case. Officers 
Slaugh and Olsen stopped Despain because the license 
plate light on his trailer was not lighted and after they 
ascertained the trailer was registered to Despain. 
Officer Slaugh remembered Despain from a prior 
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encounter that resulted in narcotics and concealed 
weapon charges. Apparently, Officer Slaugh did not 
communicate this information to Officer Olsen, and 
Officer Olsen testified that he had no knowledge of 
Despain's prior encounter with Officer Slaugh. The 
majority then holds that the following facts establish 
that Officer Olsen had reasonable, articulable suspicion 
to ask Despain about weapons: Despain approached the 
officers "wearing an untucked, overly large shirt that 
[could have] obscured any object that [he] may have 
[hidden] in his waistband"; Despain exited the cab of 
his truck, re-entered the cab, closed the door (thus 
"completely ignor [ing]" the officers), and then 
re-exited the cab; the officers encountered "an 
apparently dangerous dog" in the bed of the truck; and 
the traffic stop occurred at night. 
H 21 In my view, these circumstances do not amount to 
reasonable, articulable suspicion. First, there was no 
evidence that would indicate that Officer Olsen could 
reasonably believe that Despain possessed weapons on 
his body. No evidence was presented that Despain's 
clothing exhibited bulges or any other indications of 
weapons that would warrant a question regarding 
weapons. See id. Rather, Officer Olsen could point only 
to Despain's untucked, overly large shirt that may have 
obscured any weapon hidden in Despain's waistband. 
This court has found that "baggy, layered clothing," 
does not amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion by 
itself. Id. at 121. Similarly, Officer Olsen's belief that 
Despain may have tucked away a weapon in his 
waistband, absent any evidence that would otherwise 
indicate the presence of a weapon, does not amount to 
reasonable, articulable suspicion. See id_ (noting that 
"officer's testimony that he performed a patdown search 
because suspect' "potentially may have been armed"... 
add[ed] nothing' to the reasonable suspicion 
determination because '[i]n every encounter with a 
citizen by the police, the citizen may potentially be 
armed.' " (alterations in original) (quoting People v. 
Dickev. 21 Cal.App.4th 952. 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44, 46 
(1994))); cf. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993) (holding that "simply wearing a winter 
coat" is not a factor that would indicate whether a 
suspect was armed). 
% 22 Second, there was no evidence that Despain 
aggressively approached the officers. See Lafond, 2003 
UT App 101 at % 20.68 P.3d 1043. Although Despain 
re-entered the cab when the officers first ordered him to 
approach them, he eventually complied and walked 
toward them. While the majority argues that Despain 
"completely ignored" the officers' request, this 
characterization is an overstatement. There is no 
evidence that indicates how long Despain "ignored" the 
officers' request to approach. The record does show that 
Despain exited the cab and approached the officers 
after the officers' second order. Logic suggests that 
Despain re-entered the cab of his vehicle to retrieve 
documentation, particularly when confronted by two 
police officers with their dangerous weapons drawn. 
*6 % 23 While it makes sense for the officers to retreat 
from the "apparently dangerous dog," I fail to see how 
this creates a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
Despain may have been armed. If anything, the 
presence of Despain's dangerous dog cuts against the 
notion that Despain would feel the need to carry 
weapons. 
U 24 Finally, the majority factors the nighttime traffic 
stop into its reasonable, articulable suspicion analysis. 
I fail to see how a nighttime traffic stop creates a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that an individual may 
be armed. Individuals may be armed day or night. Our 
law requires officers to point to "specific, articulable 
facts" regarding the suspect to allow an officer to 
conduct a Teny frisk or to question a suspect for 
weapons. Id. at*i 13 (quotations and citations omitted). 
The time of day of a police encounter adds nothing 
relevant to the reasonable, articulable suspicion 
analysis. 
% 25 Based on the foregoing, I dissent from the 
majority's conclusion that Officer Olsen had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to inquire whether Despain had 
any weapons. 
FN1. Despain does not challenge the officer's 
search of his vehicle and trailer incident to his 
arrest. 
FN2. The State urges this court to adopt a rule 
that would make an officer's inquiry into the 
presence of weapons reasonable per se 
regardless of whether the question is 
supported by other reasonable suspicion. See 
United States v. Holt. 264 F.3d 1215 J 225-26 
(10th Cir.2001) (concluding that an officer's 
questioning of a motorist concerning the 
presence of a loaded weapon does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, 
questions concerning loaded weapons are 
considered to be within the normal course of 
a traffic stop.). Without addressing the 
applicability of Holt to the instant case, we 
decline to adopt such a rule because (1) 
adopting such a position would be contrary to 
existing supreme court doctrine, see State v 
Hansen. 2002 UT 125. IT 30-32, 63 P.3d 650 
(highlighting the limited and prescribed 
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behavior allowed by police officers during the 
temporary detention of a citizen); and (2) our 
conclusion that Despain's behavior following 
the stop reasonably led the officers to believe 
that he was armed and dangerous forecloses 
any need to adopt the position urged by the 
State. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to 
the traditional confines of police-citizen 
encounters and reserve our analysis of the 
State's suggestion for an appropriate case. 
FN3. The trial court relied on the prior contact 
between Slaugh and Despain to support its 
decision to deny Despain's motion to suppress. 
However, Slaugh merely asked Despain for 
his license and registration, while it was Olsen 
who asked Despain about weapons. Moreover, 
Olsen did not know of the prior encounter 
between Slaugh and Despain and the 
testimony of Slaugh makes clear that Olsen 
had no reason to believe anything more than a 
simple traffic stop was occurring prior to their 
approaching the truck to complete the traffic 
stop. Accordingly, because Olsen had no 
history with Despain and was not aware of 
Slaugh's history with Despain, the trial court 
erred in considering the prior encounter as 
material to the issue. 
FN4. Despain does not challenge the trial 
court's factual findings; thus, we accept them 
as drafted by the court. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
